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 In regulating the authority and discretion exercised by contemporary prosecutors, 
national systems balance a variety of goals, many of which are in tension or direct conflict.  For 
example, making prosecutors politically or democratically accountable may conflict with the 
principle of prosecutorial neutrality, and the goal of efficiency may conflict with accuracy.  
National systems generally seek to foster equal treatment of defendants and respect for their 
rights while also controlling or reducing crime and protecting the rights of victims.  Systems that 
recognize prosecutorial discretion also seek to establish and implement policy decisions about 
the best ways to address various social problems, priorities, and the allocation of resources.  
Finally, all national systems are facing the challenge of increasing caseloads. 
 
 The United States differs from France and Germany in the training and selection of 
prosecutors, in the understanding of their role, and in the structure of prosecutorial authority.  
This chapter explores how these differences affect the balance each system has struck among the 
competing goals of accountability, neutrality, efficiency, accuracy, and equal treatment, how 
these systems differ in the availability of mechanisms to establish and implement policies, and 
how each is responding to the challenges of increasingly heavy caseloads.   
 
 From a comparative perspective, the most distinctive features of the U.S. system are the 
democratically controlled and deliberately fragmented structure of prosecutorial authority and 
the very broad discretion accorded to prosecutors in both charging and plea negotiations.  First, 
the U.S. system deliberately divides prosecutorial authority between states and the federal 
government. Most authority is exercised within states, by more than 2,300 chief prosecutors who 
are generally elected at the county level.  Elected prosecutors are expected to respond to local 
conditions and the attitudes of the community they serve, resulting in wide variances in the 
priorities, procedures, policies, and practices of individual prosecutorial offices.  At the federal 
level, a different structure of political accountability provides a mechanism for establishing and 
implementing policy decisions and setting priorities: prosecution is an executive function, and 
the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys in each district are political appointees of the 
president’s party.  While the structure of the U.S. system is designed to foster democratic control 
and accountability, these features raise several concerns including the potential for (1) political 
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influences to affect prosecutorial decision making, and (2) inconsistent treatment of similar cases 
because of differences in priorities and procedures among prosecutorial districts.  Another 
unique feature of the U.S. system is the wide authority possessed by prosecutors within the 
fragmented system. U.S. prosecutors exercise very broad discretion in both charging and plea 
bargaining, which are recognized as essential parts of the criminal justice system. The U.S. 
system efficiently processes a large number of criminal cases, but its heavy reliance on 
prosecutorial charging discretion to reduce the number of prosecutions and to negotiate pleas in 
most cases raises significant concerns about accuracy and about inconsistent treatment of 
similarly situated individuals.  These concerns are magnified because prosecution is not a distinct 
career in the U.S., and no specialized training is a prerequisite in either the federal or state 
system.  But paradoxically, although the fragmentation of the U.S. system inevitably produces 
disparity, the internal structure of the federal system also provides a mechanism capable of 
producing a uniform national approach to a very limited number of cases and issues.  This allows 
the U.S. to comply with treaty obligations regarding foreign corruption cases, which are 
aggressively prosecuted by a small unit within the Department of Justice, and to require the 
Attorney General’s approval of all death penalty cases brought in the federal system.  This 
uniform and centralized approach, however, is the exception not the norm. 
 
 In contrast to the American system, prosecution is a well-defined civil service career in 
France and Germany, and the training and selection procedures are uniform and non-political.  
Although these common features promote prosecutorial expertise, independence, and 
professionalism, the French and German systems diverge in critical ways.  They have distinctive 
ways of responding to the competing concerns of accountability, neutrality, efficiency, accuracy, 
and equal treatment.  They differ in the availability of mechanisms to establish and implement 
policies.  And perhaps most importantly, they respond differently to the challenges of 
increasingly heavy caseloads.  
 
 In France, the prosecution function is organized at a national level as a part of the judicial 
branch.  The uniform training of prosecutors and a centralized bureaucratic structure promote 
consistency in standards and practices, and the placement of the prosecution function within the 
judicial branch reinforces strong norms of prosecutorial independence and neutrality.  Because 
the discretion accorded to French prosecutors includes charging, case management, diversion to 
non-criminal alternatives, and plea negotiation, the system has the capacity to adjust to 
increasing caseloads.  One structural feature, however, has generated considerable controversy: 
the executive has broad supervisory authority over the prosecution function.  Although this 
structure provides a degree of political accountability as well as a mechanism for establishing 
policies and priorities, it also raises concerns about the potential for political interference with 
prosecutorial independence and neutrality.  Controversial reforms touching on prosecutorial 
independence were adopted in 2013. 
 
 Germany differs from France in both the traditional conception of the prosecutor’s role 
and the structure of prosecutorial authority, and the German understanding of prosecutorial 
independence and neutrality is quite distinctive.  According to the traditional understanding of 
the German inquisitorial system, full prosecution of all known offenses is required; in this 
system, the prosecutor is an objective and neutral fact-finder who must seek the truth and pursue 
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all possible charges. With a norm of full enforcement, the legislature sets the priorities when it 
enacts criminal legislation.  The traditional German commitment to objective truth, full 
prosecution and proportional punishment is fundamentally at odds with the expansive U.S. 
conception of prosecutorial discretion over both charging and plea negotiations.  The German 
system is designed to produce uniform and accurate results in all cases, but as caseloads 
increased it has proven impossible to sustain these ideals.  Although prosecutorial discretion and 
plea bargaining are currently regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature and 
courts are struggling to promulgate new procedures that will permit greater efficiency while still 
adhering closely to the concept of objective truth and accuracy in both guilt and punishment.  
Prosecutors have been given statutory authority to dispose of cases summarily with little judicial 
oversight, and–despite the traditional norms–plea negotiations have become common.  This 
discretion is being exercised in a decentralized system.  Although German criminal law is 
enacted by the national legislature, virtually all of the prosecution function is allocated to the 
states.  Accordingly, resource allocation and the establishment of prosecutorial standards and 
priorities occur at the state level.  Moreover, as in France, there is a degree of executive control 
over the prosecution, though in Germany it occurs at the state level.  This structure provides a 
mechanism for political accountability and permits policy oversight, but may allow political 
interference with prosecutorial decision making.  Now that German prosecutors are exercising de 
facto prosecutorial discretion, significant regional differences, and differences between 
individual prosecutorial offices, have developed in the treatment of common offenses. 
Additionally, the delegation of authority to the states means that there is no mechanism to set 
national priorities or carry out international obligations (such as the obligation to prosecute 
foreign political corruption). 
 
 This chapter begins with a description of the U.S. approach to the structure of 
prosecutorial authority, the training, selection and ethos of U.S. prosecutors, and the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in the U.S.  Part II turns to a comparison of the French and German 
systems.  On the basis of this foundation, Part III then considers how the three systems are 
resolving some of the key tradeoffs between the goals of efficiency, accuracy, democratic 
accountability, neutrality, consistency, and the need for mechanisms to set priorities and policies.  
It concludes that the structure of prosecutorial authority is continuing to play a significant role in 
each system’s distinctive response to prosecutorial discretion.  In contrast, differences in the 
traditional understanding of the prosecutor’s role seem to be of diminishing importance as each 
system responds to the pressure of increasing caseloads. 
 
 I. Prosecution in the U.S. 
 
The U.S. is a federal system, and both the federal government and the states have the 
authority to define and punish criminal violations.
1
 This division of responsibility permits 
significant differences between federal and state practices, and–as noted below–between and 
within individual states.  This variability is enhanced by traditions concerning the training and 
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selection of both individual prosecutors and chief prosecutors.  In general, the U.S. systems 
promote some form of democratic accountability, and the fragmentation of authority virtually 
guarantees that different offices will develop different priorities and practices. 
 
A. The structure of prosecutorial authority and the education and selection of prosecutors 
 
 The U.S. systems for the selection and retention of chief prosecutors are designed to 
create political accountability, though the federal and state systems structure this accountability 
differently.  U.S. Attorneys are political appointees who report to the Attorney General—a 
political appointee and member of the president’s cabinet—and to other senior political 
appointees within the Department of Justice.  At the state level there is some variation, but 
generally district attorneys and state attorneys general run for elections, often on a partisan 
ballot. 
 
 At the federal level, democratic accountability is achieved through a system of political 
appointments.  The federal constitution lodges all executive power in the president.
2
  The 
president’s prosecutorial authority (part of the power to “execute” federal law3) has been 
delegated to approximately one hundred individuals—the Attorney General, several other senior 
officials in the Justice Department, and the United States Attorneys in each of the 94 federal 
judicial districts—who are nominated by the president, subject to Senate confirmation, and 
removable by the president at any time.
4
   
 
 In contrast to the federal model of a unitary executive, most states disaggregate the 
responsibility for both law enforcement and prosecution, and they allocate both to elected 
officials.
5
 Most chief prosecutors serve county-based jurisdictions,
6
 and in 2005 there were 2,344 
state prosecutor’s offices.7  Forty seven states elect their chief prosecutors.8   
                                                          
2
 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1. (providing “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
3
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 (president “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed”). 
4
 In addition to the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorneys 
General for the Criminal, National Security, Civil Rights, Environmental, Tax, and Antitrust 
Divisions have prosecutorial responsibilities.  Because the Associate Attorney General 
supervises some of these divisions, that office can also be characterized as one with prosecutorial 
authority.  For a discussion of the allocation of responsibility between the U.S. Attorneys and the 
officials at Main Justice, Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States 
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 398-409 (2009). 
5
 For a discussion of the historical development of the current state systems, see JOAN E. JACOBY, 
THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3-43 (1980).  Prosecutors were not 
elected in the early republic, and indeed they were generally regarded as minor figures closely 
related to the courts.  Id. at 21—22, 24. The democratic revival that accompanied the election of 
Andrew Jackson led to the expansion of elected offices, including district attorneys, and by the 
Civil War the position was perceived to be executive in character.  Id. at 22, 26—27.  By 1912, 
all 48 states had a prosecuting attorney office, and only Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Rhode Island, and Florida did not elect their prosecutors.  Id. at 26. 
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 U.S. prosecutors must have a law degree, but no specialized training is required.
9
  
Prosecution is not generally viewed as a distinct career. Many litigators work for a period of time 
in a prosecutor’s office to get courtroom experience, and most prosecutors’ offices have a high 
degree of turnover.  Each office establishes its own hiring procedures and criteria.
10
  For 
example, some offices hire graduates who have just finished law school, but others seek 
candidates with some experience.
11
 Although the absence of a distinct educational or career track 
removes some structural sources of shared values and experience, the adversarial process itself 
appears to serve as a catalyst for the development of a distinct prosecutorial identity.
12
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 In three states—Alaska, Connecticut, and Delaware—the attorney general is the chief 
prosecutor in a unified statewide system.  The attorneys general of Connecticut and Delaware are 
elected, and the small size of these states may make their responsibilities as chief prosecutor 
comparable to some degree to those of the chief prosecutors in the largest counties or 
metropolitan areas. 
7
 Steven W. Perry, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Survey of Prosecutors: Prosecutors in 
State Courts, 2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. 
The title of the chief prosecutor varies from state to state; the most common titles are district 
attorney, prosecuting attorney, county attorney, but other titles are used as well.  See id., 
Appendix, at 11. 
8
 Delaware, Rhode Island, Alaska, New Jersey, and Connecticut do not elect their local 
prosecutors. Delaware and Rhode Island are so small that a system of local prosecutors may be 
infeasible. Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, 39 PROSECUTOR 28, 
32 (May/June 2005). In New Jersey, the governor appoints the district attorney, whereas in 
Connecticut an independent constitutional agency, the Criminal Justice Commission, does so.  
Id.; see also State of Connecticut Criminal Justice Commission, 
http://www.ct.gov/cjc/site/default.asp.  The Alaska attorney general is appointed by the governor 
and must be confirmed by the state legislature.  Jacoby, supra, at 33; see also William Yardley, 
Legislators Reject Palin Pick for Alaska Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A18 
(noting that the Alaska legislature voted 35 to 23 to reject Governor Sarah Palin’s attorney 
general nominee, Anchorage lawyer Wayne A. Ross). 
9
 The U.S. Department of Justice and some individual chief prosecutors do conduct staff training.  
The Department maintains a national advocacy training center in South Carolina, which trains 
more than 10,000 federal, state, and local prosecutors and litigators in advocacy skills and 
management of legal operations annually.  For more information on the National Advocacy 
Center, see http://www.justice.gov/usao/training/. 
10
 For an excellent discussion of the variation among prosecutors’ offices and how structural 
differences may affect the behavior of prosecutors, see Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, 
Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119  (2013) 
11
 Id. at 1144-46 (contrasting office that hires only veteran prosecutors with another that hires 
new law school graduates). 
12
 Research on the causes of wrongful convictions in the U.S. has identified the problem of 
“tunnel vision,” i.e., unconscious cognitive biases that affect both police and prosecutors, which 
become stronger, rather than weaker, as prosecutors gain experience.  There is evidence that 
these biases affect even prosecutors who are most committed to the ideal of doing justice, and 
that the structure of the U.S. adversarial system exacerbates these natural biases.  See generally 
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  B. Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
 U.S. prosecutors have extraordinarily wide discretion within a system that deliberately 
fragments prosecutorial authority.  The state systems generally lack mechanisms to require or 
even promote prosecutorial uniformity.  Variations reflecting local conditions and the 
preferences of the electorate in different states (or different counties within a state) are 
understood to serve the values of federalism and democratic accountability.  The federal system 
also allocates significant discretion to the U.S. Attorneys in the 94 judicial districts, but it 
balances that distributed authority with structural and administrative mechanisms that promote–
or in some cases require– prosecutorial uniformity in certain kinds of prosecutions. 
 
 The courts and commentators alike recognize that U.S. prosecutors have wide discretion 
in determining whether and what criminal charges should be brought, and this discretion is 
subject to virtually no legislative or judicial oversight.
13
  For example, in a 1979 decision the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
 
This Court has long recognized that, when an act violates more than one criminal statute, 
the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against 
any class of defendants. Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion.
14
 
 
U.S. prosecutors have equally broad discretion in deciding whether to offer or agree to a plea 
bargain, and, if so, what the terms of the agreement will be.
15
  Indeed, contemporary 
commentators have recognized that the U.S. criminal justice system now operates as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291. See also Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The 
Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 486–87, 490 (2006) (noting that U.S. 
prosecutors have constant interaction with the police, victims, and prosecution witnesses, but 
little contact with the defendant, his family and friends, and defense counsel and this encourages 
empathy and loyalty within the prosecution team but isolation from—and often negative attitudes 
toward—the defense). 
13
 The courts do recognize that prosecutors may not base their decisions on suspect constitutional 
criteria, such as race, but even that limitation is virtually impossible to enforce because of the 
crippling evidentiary burden the defense must meet even to gain discovery of evidence that 
might support such a claim. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective 
Prosecution:  Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI. L. REV. 605 (1998) (analyzing the 
seemingly “insuperable” evidentiary hurdles for defendants seeking to prove selective 
prosecution after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 4546 
(1996). 
14
 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979) (citations omitted.) 
15
 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1034 (5th ed. 2009) (stating 
that “plea bargaining is an aspect of the prosecutor’s broad charging discretion whereunder he is 
permitted to decide when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge 
shall be made, or whether to dismiss proceedings once they are brought”). 
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administrative system, in which virtually all critical decisions are made by prosecutors, not an 
adversarial trial-based system.
16
   
 
 Given the nature of the federal system and the deliberate fragmentation of prosecutorial 
authority, it is not surprising that prosecutorial priorities and practices differ markedly among the 
states and also among local prosecutors within a single state. Indeed, within most states no 
structure exists to require or promote uniform enforcement among local prosecutors.  
Enforcement of the death penalty provides a highly visible example. Prosecutors are expected to 
reflect and accommodate community attitudes, especially on such hot button issues,
17
 and 
enforcement patterns vary widely in the 32 states that have the death penalty.  The vast majority 
of death sentences originate in only five of these states.
18
  Even within the busiest death penalty 
states, death sentences were clustered in approximately 1% of counties from 2004 to 2009.
19
  
Prosecutorial practices have played a significant role in producing this pattern, though it also 
reflects a variety of other factors including jury behavior and the success of various legal 
challenges. Enforcement of mandatory minimum sentencing laws reveals a similar pattern.  For 
example, after California passed the nation’s harshest three strikes sentencing law, enforcement 
varied significantly from county to county.
20
  Gil Garcetti, the Los Angeles District Attorney, 
took a hard line and issued written instructions stating that all prosecutors were “‘duty-bound’” 
to press for three strikes sentences.
21
  In a subsequent election Garcetti was defeated by a 
candidate who campaigned on a promise to use proportionality in deciding whether to charge a 
third strike.
22
  
 
 Within some individual offices in the state systems, there are mechanisms to promote 
uniformity.  At the county or district level, it appears that many individual offices have internal 
policies or guidelines, but these are not generally made available to the public and little is known 
about either their content or administration. 
                                                          
16
 See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2117 (1998). 
17
 New Hampshire provides an interesting counter example. The State Attorney General’s Office 
is responsible for initiating and conducting prosecutions for capital murder, and it has a broad 
consultative process for determining whether the criteria for initiating a capital murder 
prosecution are met as well as special training for prosecutors handling capital cases.  See FINAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE at 34 (2010), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NHDeathPenalty.pdf.  New 
Hampshire’s statute is one of the narrowest in the U.S., and it had only two death penalty trials in 
the last 50 years, leading to a single death sentence.  Id. at 14. 
18
 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
227, 230 (2012). 
19
 Id. at 233 (this 1% of countries accounts for 44% of death penalty sentences). 
20
 Sara Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing: Three Strikes Laws and the Limits of the Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Review, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 427, 434 (Donna Coker & 
Robert Weisberg, eds., 2013) (noting a study finding variance between much higher frequencies 
in Los Angeles than in Alameda and San Francisco counties). 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 434—35. 
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 At the federal level, all prosecutors are part of the executive branch headed by the 
president, and this structure provides a framework in which national priorities can be set and 
policies and procedures established.  (Note, however, that because the constitution delegates 
plenary police powers to the states, these policies and procedures apply only to federal 
prosecutions, which make up less than 10% of U.S. felony cases.
23
)  Perhaps the most important–
and controversial–such policy was a general directive (modified in later administrations) 
requiring all federal prosecutors to prosecute all defendants for the most serious readily provable 
offense.
24
  More recently, in 2010 Attorney General Eric Holder instructed all federal 
prosecutors to conduct “an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit 
the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purpose of the Federal criminal 
code, and maximize the impact of Federal resources on crime.”25  Subsequently, in 2013 
Attorney General Holder instructed federal prosecutors not to trigger mandatory sentencing 
enhancements for low-level non-violent drug offenders.
26
   
 
The United States Attorneys’ Manual also provides guidance on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in the federal system.
27
 Most of its provisions are so broad and general 
that they do little more than establish a framework for decision-making in most individual cases.  
However, centralized review and approval are required for a few kinds of federal cases: cases 
eligible for the federal death penalty,
28
 charges under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA)
29
 and the Racketeering and Organized Crime (RICO) statute, and criminal tax charges.
30
 
                                                          
23
 The number of prosecutions in each jurisdiction and percentage of the total that are brought in 
the federal courts varies from year to year, but federal prosecutions are less than 10% of the total.  
See generally ABRAMS, ET AL., supra note 1 at 13.   
24
 For a discussion of this directive, see Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, 
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 1440-42 (2008) (describing 
origins of the “Thornburg Memorandum,” which “sought to centralize the exercise of 
prosecutorial power essentially by delegitimating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion”). 
25
 Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to All Federal Prosecutors (Aug. 12, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf (discussing the 
department policy on charging and sentencing). 
26
 Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to the United States Attorneys and Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013) (instructing prosecutors not to 
charge drug quantities that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences for low-level non-
violent defendants with no significant criminal history), available at   
http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-
minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf. 
27
 See generally Title 9 of THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL (hereinafter USAM), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/title9.htm.  
28
 USAM §§ 9-10.010 et seq. (setting forth procedures for capital case review, including review 
by capital case unit at Main Justice and final decision by the Attorney General). 
29
 Id., USAM § 9-47.110 (requiring information about possible violations of FCPA to be brought 
to the attention of the Fraud Section in the Criminal Division, and providing for trial of FCPA 
cases unless otherwise provided for by the head of the Criminal Division). 
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There are also more detailed guidelines stating the factors to be considered and the procedures to 
be followed when a corporation may be prosecuted.
31
  
 
 II. Prosecution in France and Germany 
 
 Although prosecution is a career appointment in both France and Germany, there are 
significant differences in their conception of the prosecutor’s role and the organization of the 
prosecutorial function.  In France, the prosecutorial function is organized at the national level, 
and the centralized bureaucratic structure reflects the continuing influence of Napoleonic 
reforms.  Although individual prosecutors are understood to have significant charging discretion, 
mechanisms also exist to set national priorities, promote uniform practices, and develop 
specialized expertise and authority for certain types of cases.  Though the French characterize 
prosecutors as part of the judiciary, concerns about interference with prosecutorial independence 
led to reforms in 2013.  Commentators disagree about the significance of the changes.  In 
particular, it is unclear whether the reforms have significantly bolstered the independence of 
French prosecutors in politically salient white collar cases.  In contrast, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is difficult to reconcile with the traditional German view of the 
prosecutor’s role as an objective fact finder in an inquisitorial system based on the principle of 
mandatory prosecution.  Dramatic caseload increases have made full adherence to these 
traditional norms impossible, and in effect German prosecutors are now exercising both charging 
and bargaining discretion.  Statutory procedures allow prosecutors to dispose of certain cases 
with little judicial input, and statutory authority now exists for a limited form of negotiated 
confession.  It is questionable whether new statutory requirements for negotiated guilty pleas will 
be followed.  Germany delegates almost all enforcement authority to its sixteen states (Länder), 
and within states the prosecution function is part of the ministry of justice.  As German  
prosecutors exercise more discretion, this structure raises concerns about political interference 
with prosecutorial decision making, and the delegation of authority means Germany has no 
mechanism for setting national enforcement priorities. 
   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30
 Id., §§ 9-10.010 et. seq. (requiring all cases in which the death penalty might be applicable to 
be submitted to a national committee appointed by the Attorney General, which can override the 
recommendation of the U.S. Attorney), 9-110.200 et seq. (requiring U.S. Attorney seeking to 
bring RICO charges to submit a detailed prosecutorial memorandum meeting stringent 
requirements to obtain approval from the Criminal Division), and §6-4.200 (requiring U.S. 
Attorney to obtain approval of the Tax Division before bringing criminal tax charges). 
31
 Id., § 9-28.100 et. seq. (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations). 
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A. France 
French prosecutors
32
 are part of the career judiciary, the magistrature.
33
 The judiciary is 
divided into two bodies: the standing judiciary (which includes prosecutors), and the sitting 
judiciary (which includes trial judges and juges d’instruction or investigating magistrates).  
Entrance to the magistrature is by a competitive examination, followed by training at a national 
school, the Ecole nationale de la magistrature (ENM).
34
  The common training of future 
prosecutors, trial judges, and investigating magistrates creates ties of both “collegiality and 
ideology.”35  Magistrats may move from the standing to the sitting judiciary, or vice versa.  They 
are part of what one author described as a national corps of highly educated bureaucrats, a “‘new 
nobility.’”36 
 
 The national structure of the judiciary, including the parquet, reflects the centralization 
that was part of the Napoleonic reforms.
37
  These reforms adopted a military model for the civil 
service, including hierarchy and the uniform enforcement of clear rules.
38
  The government 
structure also reflects a fear of judicial power, and an effort to limit the judicial role to the 
declaring and applying the text of the law.
39
 
 
 Although the sitting judiciary operates independently of the executive branch of the 
French government, the Minister of Justice has the ultimate authority over the parquet.
40
 This 
structure provides political accountability and may also help produce consistency in 
prosecutorial practices and standards.  The French Code of Criminal Procedure defines the 
Minister of Justice’s role as “conducting the policy of public action determined by the 
government. . . ensur[ing] the consistency of its application.”41  In carrying out this role, the 
Justice Minister may promulgate written guidelines to the parquet and can request that specific 
violations of the law be prosecuted.
42
  The Justice Minister may also “move, promote or transfer 
prosecutors and [] nominate her own political allies.”43 This structural feature has been 
controversial, and, as noted below, reforms were adopted in 2013. 
 
 The Minister of Justice commands the Attorney General (procureur général), who in turn 
“ensure[s] the application of the criminal law to the fullest extent” by “organizing and 
coordinating the actions of the prosecutors of the Republic, regarding both prevention and 
                                                          
32
 In the literature and popular culture, the terms parquet, ministère public, and procureurs 
appear to be used interchangeably to refer to prosecutors. 
33
 JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 69 (2005). 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. (quoting Bourdieu). 
37
 Id. at 16. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 17.  
40
 Id. at 67. 
41
 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.], art. 30 (Fr.). 
42
 Id. 
43
 Hodgson, supra note 33, at 81-82. 
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punishment of offenses under the criminal law and the conduct of public policy action by 
prosecutors.”44 The term “attorney general” can be misleading. In France, there is an attorney 
general appointed to the Cour de cassation,
45
 which is the highest appeals court for questions of 
law, and attorneys general are also appointed in each court of appeal, one of which sits in every 
département in France.
46
  Prosecutors in the courts of original jurisdiction (e.g., cours de assises, 
for felonies) are expected to follow the orders of the attorneys general of the appeals court in 
their jurisdictions.
47
  The attorneys general are nominated in a political process, which has led to 
concern that political control can compromise the parquet’s appearance of independence.48  
 
 Although Article 64 of the French Constitution nominally guarantees the independence of 
all magistrates, its guarantee does not apply to prosecutors.
49 The Minister of Justice’s ability to 
issue instructions to prosecutors, combined with the influence she has over the trajectory of the 
prosecutor’s career, means that French prosecutors lack full independence.50   
 
Two controversial reforms adopted in 2013 sought to address the ability of the Minister 
of Justice to interfere with individual prosecutions, as well as special concerns with the integrity 
of politically sensitive white collar prosecutions. On July 25, 2013, the French National 
Assembly passed a law that modified the French Code of Criminal Procedure.
51
 As amended, 
Article 30 forbids the Minister of Justice from issuing instructions to prosecutors in individual 
cases.
52
 Previously, Article 30 was interpreted to permit such instructions.
53
 Although it appears 
                                                          
44
 See C. PR. PÉN., art. 35. 
45
 See LA MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, PROCUREUR, available at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-
ministere-de-la-justice-10017/direction-des-services-judiciaires-10022/procureur-26218.html 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2014). 
46
 See id. 
47
 RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 162 
(Matthew Bender & Co., 7
th
 ed., 2009). 
48
 Jacqueline Hodgson, Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal Justice:  
Some Empirical Observations, 29 Law & Soc’y Rev. 227, 234 n. 30 (2002) (also criticism of the 
fact that the council which appoints trial judges and judges d’ instruction plays no role in the 
selection of attorneys general). 
49
 Hodgson, supra note 33, at 76.  
50
 Id. Professor Hodgson notes that while ministerial instructions concerning a case are required 
to be put in writing and placed in the case dossier, “less formal communications continue to be 
issued and are often treated as formal instructions.” Id. at 75-76. 
51
 Loi no. 2013-669 du 25 juillet 2013 relative aux attributions du garde des sceaux et des 
magistrats du ministère public en matière de politique pénale et de mise en œuvre de l'action 
publique [Law no. 2013-669 of 25 July 2013 concerning the powers of the Minister of Justice 
and public prosecutors in criminal policy and implementation of policy], available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000027751362. 
52
 C. PR. PÉN, art. 30 (version in force July 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=331199D2BF156C59EE564125F
0C20C76.tpdjo14v_1?idArticle=LEGIARTI000027753870&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154
&categorieLien=id&dateTexte=20140113. 
53
 Prior to 2013, the Code was generally interpreted to permit the Minister of Justice to order  
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at first glance that Article 35 might allow the Minister of Justice to make an end-run around the 
prohibition on individual instructions by operating through the attorneys general, the 
corresponding modifications in that statute appear to demonstrate the National Assembly’s intent 
to foreclose even indirect ministerial control over individual cases.
54
  In December 2013 the 
legislature also passed a controversial law creating a new prosecutorial position at the Tribunal 
de Grand Instance in Paris with concurrent jurisdiction over complex financial crimes.
55
 
Although the new law was presented as part of an effort to fight white collar crime, critics 
attacked the measure on several grounds.  First, they charged that it was redundant and 
unnecessary because specialized financial crime courts already exist in France.
56
 Second, the top 
magistrates’ unions voiced concerns that the centralization of financial crime cases could 
undermine prosecutorial independence and lead to greater executive interference.
57
  Furthermore, 
due to a provision of the law known as the “Bercy lock,” prosecutors will not have the ultimate 
say regarding whether a tax evasion should be prosecuted.
58
 Instead, a committee controlled by 
the Budget Minister will ultimately make that decision.
59
 Third, some commentators predicted a 
bureaucratic nightmare for the new financial prosecutor, given that she would share jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
written submissions in individual cases, as well as dismissal, release, or acquittal.  See Pascal 
Lemoine, Ministère Public[:] Organisiation. Attribution du garde des Sceaux, in 
JURRISCLASSEUR PROCÉDURE PÉNALE  para. 64, Feb. 26, 2005.   
54
 Compare C. PR. PÉN art. 35 (version in force from March 7, 2007 to July 27, 2013) (declaring 
that attorney general coordinates the actions of prosecutors and the conduct of public policy 
within his jurisdiction) with C. PR. PÉN art. 35 (version in force on July 27, 2013) (the attorney 
general “clarifies” and “adapts” the instructions of the minister of justice, but only “assesses” 
their application by prosecutors), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=331199D2BF156C59EE564125F
0C20C76.tpdjo14v_1?idArticle=LEGIARTI000027753880&cidTexte=LEGITEXT00000607115
4&categorieLien=id&dateTexte=20140113.  
55
 Loi organique n° 2013-1115 relative au procureur de la République financier (December 6, 
2013), available at 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=45D0E8B55F21B4BBC33C241AC18E0D9C
.tpdjo16v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028278945&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLi
en=id&idJO=JORFCONT000028278922.  
56
 E.g., Un procureur spécialisé en fraude fiscale, [A prosecutor specialized in tax fraud], LE 
FIGARO (July 5, 2013), available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2013/05/07/97002-
20130507FILWWW00359-un-procureur-specialise-en-fraude-fiscale.php.  
57
 Laurence de Charrette, Le parquet spécialisé ne convainc pas les magistrats, [The specialized 
prosecutorial corps does not convince the magistrates], LE FIGARO (Nov. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2013/04/10/01002-20130410ARTFIG00985-moralisation-
hollande-annonce-un-procureur-dedie-aux-affaires-financieres.php.  
58
 Quatre questions sur le procureur financier, [Four questions about the financial prosecutor], 
LE MONDE (June 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/12/05/quatre-questions-sur-le-procureur-
financier_3525335_3224.html.  
59
 Id.  
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in Paris with the general prosecutor.
60
 These problems are so glaring that at least one observer 
suggested that the law was not a true reform, but rather that the impetus for the law was to punish 
the general prosecutor for his overly zealous investigation of a cabinet member for tax evasion.
61
  
 
 Unlike Germany (discussed below) France does not recognize the principle of mandatory 
prosecution, and it is for the prosecutor to determine what action should be taken in cases 
referred to her.
62
 As Jacqueline Hodgson explains: 
 
She exercises an important discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute; in selecting 
the precise charges to be brought (which also determine the level of trial court and 
whether or not the case will be investigated by the juge d’instruction); and in determining 
whether to take no further action.  More recently, the parquet has extended this discretion 
in making use of a number of alternatives to prosecution and trial, enabling it to regulate 
further the increasing number of cases with which it is required to deal.
63
 
 
French prosecutors also have case management discretion that permits them to treat an offense 
summarily as a low level violation (referred to as correctionalisation), as well as the power to 
initiate alternatives to trial, including mediation and a range of alternative sanctions.
64
 In 2002, 
Hodgson reported that nationwide French prosecutors had declined to take further action in 
approximately 50% of the cases in which there was evidence that a crime had been committed 
and a suspect had been named.
65
 She also found “wide regional variations.”66 More recently, she 
reported an “exponential” growth in the number of cases disposed of by composition pénale, an 
alternative to prosecution which allows the prosecutor to propose a range of measures to an 
accused who admits the offense, such as community service, payment of compensation, and 
participation in drug rehabilitation.
67
  Additionally, since 2004 French prosecutors have had 
                                                          
60
 Paule Gonzalez, Juges et politiques contestent la création d'un procureur national pour les 
délits financiers [Judges and politicians contest the creation of a national prosecutor for financial 
crimes], LE FIGARO (June 11, 2013), available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-
france/2013/11/05/01016-20131105ARTFIG00552-juges-et-politiques-contestent-la-creation-d-
un-procureur-national-pour-les-delits-financiers.php. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Hodgson, supra note 48, at 233. 
63
 Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in 
Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: France, Italy, and Germany 87 YALE L. J. 240, 247 (1977) 
(stating that “The French prosecutor is not subject to a requirement of mandatory prosecution, no 
matter how serious the offense. He may rely on the “expediency” (or “opportunity”) principle to 
dismiss a case for either evidentiary or policy reasons; he need not hide “real” reasons behind 
“official” ones, or even report his decision to the court.”) 
64
 Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French 
Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 116, 124-26 (Erik Luna 
& Maryanne L. Wade, eds., 2012). 
65
 Hodgson, supra note 48, at 233 n. 27. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Hodgson, supra note 64, at 125-26 (noting increase from 1,500 cases in 2001 to more than 
73,000 cases in 2009).   
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statutory authority to enter into a form or plea or sentence bargaining (called comparution sur 
reconnaissance prealable de culpabilité, or CRCP), which now applies to offenses carrying a 
fine or term of imprisonment of ten years or less.
68
  A CRPC sentence may not be more than one 
year’s imprisonment or half of the maximum sentence for the offense.69  Although no provision 
was made for negotiation over CRPC sentences (and negotiation was specifically excluded in an 
early Ministry of Justice circular), in practice CRPC sentences are negotiated.
70
  In 2009, there 
were 77,530 CRPC sentences, accounting for 11.5 percent of total prosecutions.
71
 
 
 As noted in the previous section, the Minister of Justice can issue general written 
guidelines (often referred to as “circulars”) to bring about consistency in the application of the 
law.  The circulars are generally made available on the Ministry of Justice internet site.  For 
example, a recent circular on “The Fight Against Fraud”72 identified three national priorities: 
VAT (value added tax) fraud, transnational social fraud, and illegal internet gambling.  It 
instructed prosecutors to make “a special effort” in matters of financial recovery and financial 
sanctions. It also made illegal work a priority at the local level, targeting the following 
occupational sectors: building and public works, hotels, cafes and restaurants, services (including 
domestic services), seasonal agricultural work, and live performances.  Finally, it singled out 
welfare fraud as meriting a criminal response but also encouraged alternatives to formal criminal 
prosecution.  Recent circulars have also been issued to deal with cases involving a wide range of 
topics including juveniles, gangs, cults, and drug offenses. 
 
 B. Germany 
 
 German prosecutors (and judges) are appointed administratively to career positions after 
completing their legal education.
73
  All lawyers and judges must also undergo substantial post-
graduation, on-the-job training during a two-year internship.
74
 Thereafter lawyers may practice 
anywhere in Germany.
75
 For the first three years, appointed prosecutors and judges work at 
various court levels before receiving tenure.
76
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 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 495-7 (Fr.). 
69
 Hodgson, supra note 64, at 127. 
70
 Id.  
71
 Id. at 127 n. 36. 
72
 Maryvonne Caillibotte, BULLETIN OFFICIEL DU MINSTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE ET DES LIBERTÉS, 
Circulaire du 7 juin 2011 relative à la mise en œuvre du plan national de coordination de la lutte 
contre la fraude pour 2011 [Circular concerning the implementation of the national plan for the 
fight against fraud], available at http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/JUSD1115645C.pdf. 
73
 Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 110 (2003). Judges on 
the Federal Constitutional Court are selected by a legislative process. PETER MURRAY & ROLF 
STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 8 (2004); GG art. 94(1). 
74
 DEUTSCHES RICHTERGESETZ [DRiG] [German Statute on Judges] §§ 5a, 5b, 1 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT 2515 (2011); BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG [BRAO] [Federal Statute 
on Attorneys] § 4, 1 BUNDESGESETZBLATT 2515 (2011). 
75
 BRAO § 5. 
76
 Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 320 (1995). 
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 Germany has strong norms of prosecutorial objectivity and neutrality coupled with a 
traditional norm of mandatory prosecution.  The German prosecutor’s duty to be objective has 
been called “an ‘elementary and indispensable demand of a procedure based on the rule of 
law.’”77 Germans like to say that their prosecutors are “‘the most objective agency in the 
world.’”78 This is consistent with the German inquisitorial tradition, which aims to discover the 
objective truth rather than to preserve the parties’ ability to argue their cases fairly. German 
criminal law and procedure are designed around the principles of investigation 
(Instruktionsprinzip or Ermittlungsgrundsatz) and factual truth (Prinzip der materiellen 
Wahrheit).
79
 German criminal procedure often reflects this focus on objective truth-seeking.  
Before charges are filed, the police and prosecutors investigate alleged crimes.
80
 Prosecutors 
must investigate evidence weighing both for and against conviction.
81
 However, it should be 
noted that after a prosecutor has determined that criminal charges are warranted, she takes on an 
adversarial role at the trial.
82
  Additionally, both German police and prosecutors are subjected to 
the principle of legality (Legalitätsprinzip).
83
  This principle (which applies only to natural 
persons) requires the investigation and prosecution of every crime for which there exists a 
sufficient factual basis.
84
 
 
Germany is civil law republic composed of sixteen states (Länder).
85
 Although criminal 
law is codified entirely at the national level,
86
 it is implemented almost entirely by the states.
87
  
State ministries of justice supervise the prosecution service as well as the judicial and 
                                                          
77
 Thomas Weigend, A Judge By Any Other Name? Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the 
Public Prosecutor, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 377, 381 n. 21(Erik 
Luna & Maryanne L. Wade, eds., 2012) (quoting Beulke). 
78
 Id. at 382. 
79
 Rodolphe Juy-Birmann & Jörg Biermann, The German System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 309 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002). 
80
 StPO § 160(1). 
81
 StPO § 160(2). 
82
 Weigend, supra note 79, at 382. 
83
 Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 438–39 
(2006). 
84
 StPO § 152. See also Dubber, supra note 85, at 438 (“In Germany . . . the principle of legality 
. . . is thought to imply a principle of compulsory prosecution—a radical attempt directly to 
eliminate police and prosecutorial discretion altogether.”). 
85 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 
1949, BGBl. I (Ger.), Präambel.  
86 Richard Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 BOSTON COLLEGE INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 
317, 319 (1995). 
87
 At the trial level, the Federal Prosecution Office has jurisdiction over cases involving 
espionage, terrorism, treason, and genocide.  SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION 
SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE LAW? 98 (2014).  Federal prosecutors have broader appellate 
responsibility; they represent the state before the Federal Court of Appeals.  Id. 
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correctional systems.
88
  In each state, the minister of justice is a political appointee who serves in 
the cabinet, is responsible to the legislature,
89
 and may issue general instructions (Weisungsrecht) 
that direct prosecutors to handle groups of cases according to a particular policy,
90
 and the 
ministry also controls the allocation of resources.
91
  As in France, this structure has generated 
concerns about political influence on the prosecution function.  One author has characterized it, 
at least “on paper,” as an “existential threat to prosecutorial objectivity,”92 and the German 
Judges and Prosecutors Association called on the legislature to abolish the ministers’ right to 
issue instructions.
93
  Moreover, although the ministers seldom direct the handling of individual 
cases, in practice informal instructions are sometime given and often pertain to cases involving 
political crimes.
94
  Although prosecutors (like judges) are career civil servants who may not be 
dismissed for arbitrary reasons once they have completed their probationary service, the 
ministry’s control over certain personnel decisions provides a mechanism to reward or sanction 
prosecutors in ways that could undercut independent decision making, and this potential is 
greatest in a few states that regularly rotate prosecutors through different assignments.
95
  
Although it appears that political interference in individual cases is infrequent in most states, 
there have been high profile examples,
96
 and the author of a recent study reported that a majority 
of the more senior prosecutors she interviewed recalled at least one instance in which they were 
pressured to handle a case in a certain way. 
 
 Caseload pressures and administrative practices have dramatically undermined the 
traditional German view of the prosecutorial function.  In the last 30 years, the traditional 
principle of mandatory prosecution has gradually given way to a practice of expediency.
97
  In 
response to rising caseloads in the 1970s and again in the 1990s, the German legislature 
decriminalized some minor offenses and enacted legislation (discussed below) giving 
prosecutors new forms of authority to dispose of cases without trial.  But these measures have 
been insufficient to protect German prosecutors from crushing caseloads that make it impossible 
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 Id. 
89
 Id. Below the ministry level, the states vary.  In most, the regional general public prosecutors 
are career civil servants, but in four states they are junior political appointees.  Id. at 100. 
90
 Id. at 99. 
91
 Id. at 98-99 (noting that the allocation of resources may reflect a party’s platform, and might 
encourage or frustrate certain types of prosecutions). 
92
 Id. at 98. 
93
 Id. at 102. 
94
Id. at 99. 
95
 Id. at 99-100 (noting the greatest potential for problems in states such as Bavaria and Saxony). 
96
 The most well-known example involved the prosecutor who charged former Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl with a serious crime.  That prosecutor was given an undesirable new assignment 
that was formally a promotion, and the charges against Kohl were subsequently dismissed under 
StPO § 153a. Id. at 99 (citing R. Miller, Germany's Party Finance Scandal "Ends" With Kohl's 
Plea Bargain and Too Many Unanswered Questions, 2 GERMAN L. J. (2001), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=60 ).  
97
 Shawn Boyne, Is the Journey From the In-Box to the Out-box a Straight Line?  The Drive for 
Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 41 (Erik Luna & Maryianne L. Wade, eds., 2012). 
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for them to carry out their traditional functions.  The caseload pressures are most severe in 
general crime units, where prosecutors receive an average of 120 new cases per month, and in 
the lower courts, where prosecutors must process 1,000 case files each year.
98
 But other units 
also experience pressure.  For example, a six-lawyer drug trafficking and money-laundering unit 
prosecuted 3,800 cases in a single year.
99
 The caseload pressures have been exacerbated by the 
state-level ministries of justice, which adopted time-management practices that track 
productivity in terms of cases processed and underestimate the complexity of prosecutorial 
decision making, forcing prosecutors to ration the time they can spend on individual cases.
100
 
These workload pressures make it difficult, if not impossible, for prosecutors to conduct a full 
and objective investigation of each case.  Instead, prosecutors operate “as gate-keepers motivated 
to boost their case processing efficiency.”101 
 
 The German legal system has gradually adopted and increased its reliance on discretion 
to keep the overloaded criminal justice system functioning.  Although there were significant 
legislative changes giving prosecutors significant new forms of discretion, the other critical 
development occurred without express authorization, as trial courts, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys resorted to negotiated judgments as a means of resolving cases, especially complex 
white collar cases.
102
  
 
 The Criminal Code now includes two mechanisms that provide prosecutors with 
significant charging discretion.  Under StPO § 153a, prosecutors have discretion to decline to 
prosecute Vergehen crimes on the basis of their conclusion that there is no public interest in 
prosecution.  Although Verbrechen are sometimes compared to felonies and Vergehen to 
misdemeanors,
103
 it is important to note that many Vergehen would be felonies in the United 
States.
104
 For example, almost all business crimes are Vergehen regardless of the financial harm 
caused.
105
 Under StPO 153a, the offender must consent to the procedure, and he becomes subject 
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99
 Id. at 46.  Boyne concluded that “[w]ith the exception of a few specialized departments, the 
bulk of German prosecutors must manage heavy caseloads.” Id. at 45. 
100
 Id. at 46-47 (describing the hiring of accounting firms to conduct time-management studies of 
prosecution and discussing the effect on prosecutorial decision making). 
101
 Id. at 42. 
102
 See generally Weigend, supra note 79, at 383—85.  Rauxloh traces this development, in part, 
to the expansion of the criminal code to encompass offenses that require more than simple 
factual determinations.  REGINA RAUXLOH, PLEA BARGAINING IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW at 64-66 (2012).  
103
 See, e.g., Frase & Weigend, supra note 78, at 320 (using “felony” as a synonym for 
Verbrechen and “misdemeanor” for Vergehen). The English translation of the Criminal Code 
uses this terminology, however. StBG § 12, trans. Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander, including the 
amendment(s) to the Act by Article 3 of the Act of 2.10.2009 (I Bundesgesetzblatt 3214). In 
other cases, Verbrechen has been translated as “crime” and Vergehen as “misdemeanor.” 
104
 RICHARD FRASE, SENTENCING IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: COMPARING ÄPFEL 
WITH APPLES 5–6 (Max Planck Institute, 2001). 
105
 Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of 
Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 559 (1997). See, e.g., StBG § 263(1) (providing that 
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to certain obligations, including the payment of any damages as well as a payment to the 
Treasury or a charitable organization.  Section 153a is used extensively.  Additionally, StPO §§ 
407–12 allows a prosecutor to apply to the court for approval of a written penal order 
(Strafbefehl).  Use of a penal order avoids a trial and concludes the proceedings. The prosecution 
may apply for a penal order when the results of its investigation suggest a trial is not necessary. 
A penal order specifies the punishment, which may consist of either a fine, warning, forfeiture, 
confiscation, public announcement of the order, revocation of driving privileges, or if the 
defendant is represented by a lawyer, a suspended prison sentence of less than one year.
106
 
 
 Despite the traditional norms of the German system, a variety of factors led to the 
development of a system of negotiated judgments.  Various features of German procedure made 
it especially time consuming to process sophisticated offenses, especially white collar crimes, but 
quantitative benchmarks for judicial and prosecutorial performance created pressure to resolve 
these cases quickly.
107
 As a result, practitioners and judges began to settle criminal cases 
informally.  These negotiations were typically initiated by the defense lawyers or judges, not 
prosecutors (though the latter held an informal veto power).
108
  There was little oversight by 
appellate courts because the agreements were reached informally off the record, and they 
typically included a waiver of appeal.  However, after a number of cases reached the appellate 
courts, in 2009 the German legislature adopted a law amending the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
StPO 257c.
109
  The amendment permits the judges to initiate negotiations and to indicate the 
maximum and minimum sentences they would be willing to impose as part of an agreed 
settlement, but it also requires that the court independently find a sufficient factual basis for the 
judgment and that the sentence reflect the true guilt of the defendant.
110
  StPO 257c also gives 
the court substantial latitude to later reject the agreement. Despite the tension (if not conflict) 
with the traditional assumptions upon which the German system is based, in 2013 the German 
Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of StPO 257c, though it did so in a decision that 
emphasized the limitations the law imposes on negotiations.
111
 One commentary characterized 
the Court’s decision as placing the new law on “probation.”112 It remains doubtful whether the 
statute, even as interpreted, will be effective in changing entrenched plea negotiation practices 
that developed in response to workload and administrative pressures.  An empirical study 
solicited by the Constitutional Court and cited in its decision revealed that the current practices 
diverged widely from the strictures of the statute: for example, 59% of the judges surveyed stated 
that they conducted more than one half of their negotiations informally, rather than on the record 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fraud is punishable by between zero and five years’ imprisonment in normal cases and between 
six months and ten years’ imprisonment in especially serious cases, making fraud a Vergehen). 
106
 StPO § 407(2). 
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 See Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal 
Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 86-87 (2014). 
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 Id. at 87. 
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 Id. at 89-91 (providing an English translation of StPO 257c). 
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 Id. at 91-92. 
111
 Id. at 94-97. 
112
 Id. at 82. 
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as required by statute, and in a substantial percentage of cases the judges accepted the 
prosecution version of the facts without conducting an independent determination.
113
 
 
 Despite the legality principle, only a small minority of German cases now go to trial.  
German prosecutors now rely on the authority of these two provisions to dispose of the majority 
of cases in which individual suspects have been identified.  According to some sources, 70 to 80 
percent of all investigations are now terminated with a dismissal or a deferred sentence; these 
rates vary widely among the German states, ranging from 40 percent in the southern states to 80 
percent in some northern states.
114
  In 2009, only one in ten of the cases in which the police 
referred an identified suspect to the prosecutor’s office went to trial;115 28% were dismissed for 
lack of evidence (a determination that itself includes a discretionary determination), and many of 
the others were dismissed or adjudicated for reasons that even more clearly implicated 
prosecutorial discretion, including 12% disposed of by penal order and 26% dismissed for policy 
reasons including lack of public interest in the prosecution.
116
  In 2012, 77% of the cases 
involving known suspects were dismissed under StPO 153a, for lack of sufficient evidence or for 
policy reasons, and 52% of the remaining cases were disposed of by penal order.
117
 
 
 These procedures are employed even in cases that might be expected to be a high priority.  
A 2011 review of the implementation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention found, for example, that the prosecution was 
declined under Section 153a in more than half of the cases of foreign bribery between 2006 and 
2010.
118
  The OECD review noted that use of Section 153a permitted the imposition of monetary 
sanctions against numerous individuals, but also expressed concern that the arrangements lacked 
transparency.
119
   
 
Even broader discretion is recognized in the cases of administrative sanctions.  Because 
German law does not recognize corporate criminal liability, these are the only sanctions 
applicable to legal persons (corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities).  The principle of 
discretionary prosecution is explicitly recognized in administrative proceedings.
120
  It is thus 
applicable to any proceedings against legal persons, and to administrative proceedings against 
natural persons. 
 
III. Conclusion 
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 The stress of heavy caseloads is a reality in each of the three systems, affecting the 
balance each strikes among the competing goals that are the subject of this chapter.  In general, 
structural features‒such as the deliberate fragmentation of prosecutorial authority in the U.S.‒
play a defining role in how each jurisdiction strikes the balance, and these structural features 
have proven relatively impervious to the pressures created by rapidly rising case loads.  In 
contrast, differences in the training and selection of prosecutors and traditional views of the 
prosecutorial function have generally played a secondary role, and often given way to the need 
for greater efficiency.  All jurisdictions have responded to the need for more efficient case 
processing by according prosecutors significant discretion, despite concerns that new 
mechanisms will be needed to increase reliability.  The balance between democratic 
accountability and prosecutorial neutrality remains contested in all three jurisdictions.  Structural 
features in each system create both the opportunities for disparity in case treatment and the 
framework for responding to such disparities.  Similarly, the structure of prosecutorial authority 
determines whether and how each jurisdiction can establish priorities and carry out policies. 
 
A. Efficiency and Accuracy 
 
Caseload pressures are driving all three systems to increase efficiency by giving 
prosecutors more discretion, even in Germany where discretion is fundamentally at odds with the 
strong traditional norm of mandatory prosecution.  One commentator described this as a tension 
between traditional dogma and everyday practice in the German system.
121
  Despite their 
uniform training and professional traditions, German prosecutors have adapted their practices to 
the reality of caseload pressures and bureaucratic incentives.  The German system is still 
evolving, as both the legislature and the Constitutional Court seek to define a form of plea 
negotiation under StPO 257c that does not sacrifice core values such as the search for the truth, 
proportionality in punishment, and transparency of negotiations.  It seems doubtful, however, 
that these efforts will successfully rein in practices that developed without any legislative 
authorization and now seem well entrenched.  Indeed, the Constitutional Court’s own survey 
revealed that practices not permitted by the new legislation were widespread.  Further, the survey 
revealed two aspects in which current practices were contributing to convictions or sentences 
that could be characterized as inaccurate.  Some defendants whose lawyers believed they would 
not be found guilty confessed after being offered significant sentencing concessions, and a 
significant number of respondents characterized the negotiated sentences in at least some cases 
as too low or high.
122
   
 
On the other hand, some commentators have observed that the limitations announced by 
the German Constitutional Court provide more guarantees of accuracy and fairness than those 
present in the U.S. plea bargaining system.
123
  In the U.S., efforts to identify the causes of 
wrongful convictions have identified a variety of recurring problems, including guilty pleas by 
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innocent defendants.
124
  Recognition that the U.S. system is now more administrative than 
adversarial has led to widespread support for modifying the structure of prosecutors’ offices to 
increase both accuracy and efficiency in the initial processing of cases,
125
 and in the 
reassessment of convictions in which there may have been an error.
126
 
 
B. Democratic Accountability and Prosecutorial Neutrality 
 
All three national systems have structural mechanisms designed to provide a degree of 
democratic accountability.  The issue in both is how to balance the need for accountability with 
the commitment to prosecutorial neutrality and independence, especially in cases involving the 
investigation of politically prominent suspects who are members–or opponents–of the current 
government.   
 
In both France and Germany the oversight of the ministry of justice holds the potential 
for political interference with the prosecution function.  In France, many serious white collar 
cases appear to have a significant political element.
127
 Charges of political influence in high 
profile cases provoked sufficient controversy that legislative changes were adopted in 2013 to 
insulate prosecutorial decision making in individual cases from control by the Ministry of 
Justice.
128
  It is too soon to say how successful these changes will be in protecting the 
independence of prosecutorial decision making and in restoring public confidence.  In Germany, 
the issue of political influence seems to have less current salience, and the legislature did not 
adopt changes sought by the union of prosecutors and judges.
129
  On the other hand, a survey of 
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senior prosecutors found that the majority felt pressure in some individual cases, and the 
personnel policies in several states make them especially vulnerable to such pressures.
130
  
 
Similar concerns about politically motivated prosecutions and interference with 
prosecutorial decision making in individual cases have also arisen intermittently in the U.S.  
Critics have identified evidence of occasional partisan influences on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in the federal system.
131
 These issues arise most frequently in federal cases for a 
variety of reasons: most white collar cases (including cases involving political corruption or 
sophisticated financial crimes) are prosecuted in the federal courts, federal law includes a 
bewilderingly large number of offenses, many of which are defined in very broad terms, and 
federal prosecutors have ample investigative resources (including the powers of the grand jury) 
to develop cases.  Despite calls for reform, the design of the U.S. constitution‒which allocates all 
federal executive authority to the president‒limits the degree to which the prosecutorial function 
can be insulated from the control of the president and his political appointees.  There have been 
two significant legislative efforts to address these issues.  The first was the creation of an 
inspector general within the Department of Justice.
132
 The second was the creation of the office 
of the special prosecutor (subsequently renamed independent counsel), who was given 
independence from the Department of Justice and Attorney General so that it could pursue 
investigations and prosecutions against senior officials within the Administration free of political 
interference or conflicts of interest.
133
  The independent counsel legislation was allowed to lapse 
in 1999, and subsequent individuals designated as “independent counsel” have been appointed 
by the Attorney General pursuant to Departmental regulations.
134
 The controversy surrounding 
the Bush administration’s firing of multiple U.S. Attorneys demonstrated another constraint on 
the misuse of prosecutorial authority for political purposes: the firings provoked a storm of 
controversy that led to oversight hearings in Congress, reports by the Inspector General, and 
sustained investigation and commentary by the press.
135
 
 
C. Consistency and Equal Treatment 
 
Although it appears that all national systems regard the equal (as well as fair) treatment 
of defendants as a goal, it is in tension with many of the other goals and features of the three 
national systems.   
 
The present system in the U.S. produces at least two forms of disparity. The first is the 
consequence of the exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis by individual prosecutors in the 
absence of clear standards.  The emergence of prosecutorial discretion over charging, diversion, 
and plea negotiations in all three systems makes this form of discretion nearly inevitable unless 
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there are specific (rather than broad general) guidelines and/or required supervisory review and 
approval.  Although prosecutorial guidelines are increasingly common, in many cases the 
guidelines are stated in such general terms that they do not provide clear standards in individual 
cases.  If only a small percentage of possible cases can be prosecuted, as is often the case in the 
U.S. federal system, the result is predictable disparity, a kind of negative lottery among 
defendants who have committed offenses that could be prosecuted in the federal courts.
136
 
 
When chief prosecutors set different priorities or adopt different practices for their 
respective jurisdictions, this creates a second kind of disparity.  This form of disparity is 
immediately evident in the U.S. system, where prosecutorial authority is deliberately fragmented, 
and elected chief prosecutors are expected to take varying approaches that reflect not only local 
conditions but also the attitudes and concerns of the people the prosecutor represents.  There is 
no expectation that all elected prosecutors in a state will have the same enforcement priorities 
and policies.  There are dramatic differences, for example, in the enforcement of the so-called 
“three-strikes” laws and other mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, and in the willingness to 
seek the death penalty.  This expected variation is also an important feature of the federal system, 
which envisions states not only as distinct political communities with the right to self-
government, but as also laboratories in which different laws and policies may be tested.  On the 
other hand, the federal government, with its unitary executive, provides a hierarchical national 
structure that could be employed to increase consistency among cases falling within federal 
jurisdiction (just as the federal Sentencing Guidelines were intended to ensure that similarly 
situated offenders convicted of the same offense would receive consistent sentences in the 
federal courts).  Traditionally, however, the standards governing the discretion of federal 
prosecutors have been stated in very general terms, and central approval is now required only in 
death penalty cases and a few other kinds of prosecutions.
137
  The overlap of the federal and state 
criminal justice systems creates the potential for yet a third form of disparity, between 
defendants who engaged in the same conduct, but may be prosecuted in the federal system 
(which generally imposes longer sentences), the state system, or both.
138
  
 
There is evidence that disparity also arises in both France and Germany as a result of 
variations in the practices and priorities of prosecutors’ offices.  In France, although the 
hierarchical national structure of the prosecution and the promulgation of circulars and other 
guidance from the Ministry of Justice are intended to promote uniformity, observers have 
detected regional variations.
139
 On its face, the French National Assembly’s creation of a new 
white collar prosecutorial position appears to be an effort to enhance and centralize the approach 
to such cases, but critics have argued that the measure was unnecessary and may even be 
counterproductive.
140
  In Germany, as the de facto discretion exercised by prosecutors has 
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increased, the allocation of all enforcement authority to the states has given rise to significant 
variation at the state and regional level in the treatment of common offenses.
141
  It is difficult to 
reconcile these variations with the traditional norms of full prosecution and proportional 
punishment that reflects the true facts of each case.  
 
The disparities that occur in the French and German systems appear to lack the strong 
normative justifications that undergird the deliberate fragmentation of prosecutorial authority in 
the U.S.  France’s hierarchical national structure does not value or promote regional differences.  
Germany allocates most criminal law enforcement to its states, but this division of authority over 
criminal law does not necessarily reflect all of the same values and assumptions as American 
federalism and the further deliberate fragmentation of authority at the state level in the U.S.  
Although this delegation is surely intended to allow prosecutors in each state to respond to 
significant differences in local conditions, it is questionable whether it is intended to authorize 
divergent views on policy issues.  The structure of Germany’s federal and state courts142 and the 
general understanding of German criminal law
143
 reflect an understanding that federal criminal 
laws will be applied uniformly in the various states.  A degree of prosecutorial discretion has 
been introduced to provide a means of responding to rising caseloads, not in order to promote 
variations among the states. 
 
D.  Mechanisms for Setting Policies and Priorities 
 
Finally, the three systems vary in their capacity to reconcile the need to establish policies 
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and priorities without intruding on prosecutorial neutrality and independence.  The uniform and 
hierarchical French national system seems to have the greatest ability to achieve these goals. As 
noted above, the French system gives the Minister of Justice the authority to set priorities and 
policies.
144
 Although the legislation adopted in 2013 limits the Minister’s control of individual 
prosecutions,
145
 it does not restrict his general authority over the criminal justice system.   
 
In Germany, in contrast, enforcement authority is allocated to the states.  Although 
individual states may be able to establish priorities and policies and state ministers of justice may 
issue general instructions, the national government seems to lack that capacity, even in the case 
of cases involving national treaty obligations.  As a review of enforcement of the OECD 
convention on combatting foreign bribery noted, the power to investigate and prosecute are 
devolved to the states, “and the federal authorities have no supervisory powers.”146 
 
Paradoxically, the fragmented U.S. system provides a mechanism for uniform policy 
making in a very limited class of cases.  Like Germany, the U.S. has allocated most general 
enforcement authority to the states, but with a critical difference: five to ten percent of U.S. 
felony cases are prosecuted by federal prosecutors in the federal courts,
147
 and federal 
enforcement dominates some important fields, such as offenses involving political corruption 
and financial crimes.  Although centralized review and control of certain prosecutions is the 
exception rather than the rule even within the federal system, it is significant.  For example, the 
unitary structure of the executive itself provides a mechanism for establishing uniform standards 
for the prosecution of foreign corruption as required by common treaty obligations.  The U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual allows only the fraud section of the Criminal Division in Washington to 
prosecute cases foreign corruption cases under the FCPA.
148
  No similar mechanism is available 
within most states, which lodge all authority in the thousands of elected local prosecutors.  
Another feature of the U.S. structure provides a possibility that the federal government may 
occasionally override the decision of state prosecutors (and also state legislatures).  Although 
there are very few capital cases in the federal system, in a small number of cases the availability 
of the federal death penalty may counteract the inequality that results from differences in state 
law or the willingness of state prosecutors to seek the death penalty.  For example, 
Massachusetts state law does not authorize the death penalty, but a federal indictment was filed 
charging use of a weapon of mass destruction and Attorney General Eric Holder authorized 
federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty in the case of the man accused of killing and 
maiming people with homemade bombs at the Boston Marathon.
149
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